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True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. 
Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks 
David A. Sutphen 
INTRODUCTION 
During the course of voir dire in State v. McRae, 1 a prosecutor 
questioned the only African-American veniremember regarding 
her views on the fairness of the justice system: 
[Prosecutor:] Did you also understand that there may be certain ju-
rors who have certain feelings or attitudes about whatever ... that[ ] 
they couldn't for example, find somebody guilty because they just 
don't think the system is fair .... [Veniremember:] I understand that. 
[Prosecutor:] Okay. Knowing what you know about, you know, your 
belief that the system maybe isn't perfect, should I be concerned? Is 
it something where you don't think you could convict him if he's 
proven-[Veniremember.j No, no, no. [Prosecutor.} Okay. 
[Veniremember:] I would base my judgment on the evidence.2 
After responding to this line of inquiry, which was not posed to any 
of the white veniremembers, the prospective juror was perempto-
rily challenged by the State.3 Concerned that the prosecutor's 
strike was racially motivated, defense counsel raised an objection 
under Batson v. Kentucky. 4 
After determining that the defendant had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination,5 the trial judge afforded the prosecutor 
an opportunity to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the peremptory challenge. In his defense the prosecutor offered 
two justifications. First, that the stricken veniremember "had an 
attitude that where she thought that basically, the system is unfair 
to minorities, and the defendant's being black is - and her being 
black would over compensate by basically letting this guy off. "6 
1. 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992). 
2. 494 N.W.2d at 254-55. 
3. See 494 N.W.2d at 253. 
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In general, Batson prohibited state actors from exercising racially 
motivated peremptory challenges on the grounds that they violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
5. At a minimum, this initial burden of production requires that the moving party demon-
strate that he is a member of a protected class and that the state has exercised one or more of 
its peremptory challenges against a member of this protected class. For a more detailed 
discussion of the production requirements for Batson objections, see infra text accompanying 
notes 51-64. 
6. 494 N.W.2d at 256. 
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Second, that she "thinks the whole jury process is [a] fraud. "7 
Notwithstanding the defendant's claim that these explanations were 
pretextual, the trial judge concluded that there "was an articulable 
basis for the prosecutor's challenge in this case. "8 Thus, the case 
proceeded to trial, and the defendant was eventually convicted of 
second-degree criminal sexual conduct.9 On appeal to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, however, the trial judge's ruling was reversed 
on the ground that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenged 
strike was unworthy of credence because it was unsupported by the 
voir dire transcript.10 
The facts of State v. McRae are representative of a large number 
of Batson cases in which the validity of a prosecutor's explanation 
for a peremptory challenge is the main point of inquiry both during 
the trial and on appeal.11 This emphasis is largely a function of the 
fact that, under Batson, proof of pretext is the legal equivalent of 
proof of intentional discrimination.12 In other wor,ds, if a defendant 
7. 494 N.W.2d at 256. 
8. 494 N.W.2d at 256. 
9. See 494 N.W.2d at 253. 
10. In particular, the state supreme court noted that "the record of the prosecutor's ex-
amination of the juror in question fails to support the explanation given by the prosecutor for 
striking the juror." 494 N.W.2d at 257. Accordingly, "[t]o allow the striking of this juror ... 
in effect would allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from 
the jury panel who expressed any doubt th[ at] 'the system' is perfect." 494 N.W.2d at 257. 
The justices' words reflect a keen awareness of one of the Supreme Court's underlying 
concerns in Batson, namely that the purposeful exclusion of African-Americans from jury 
service undermines "public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). The irony, however, is that race-based strikes, like the one 
exercised in this case, contribute to the perception among blacks that the justice system is 
unfair. 
Batson also proscribed race-based prosecutorial challenges "on the assumption - or ... 
intuitive judgment - that they [blacks] would be partial to the defendant because of their 
shared race." 476 U.S. at 97. Notwithstanding this unequivocal language, the trial court in 
McRae accepted, as legitimate, the prosecutor's contention that because the defendant and 
excluded juror were both black, the veniremember "would over compensate by basically let-
ting this guy off." McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 256. 
11. Although Batson itself only dealt with the constitutionality of race-based peremptory 
challenges by the State in criminal cases where the defendant and struck juror shared the 
same race, the Supreme Court has since greatly expanded its scope. Consequently, as the law 
currently stands, Batson applies in all cases - criminal and civil - to race or gender-based 
peremptory challenges exercised by either party, regardless of whether that party shares the 
same race or gender as the excluded juror. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 114 S. Ct. 1419 
(1994) (extending Batson to gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending 
Batson to peremptory challenges exercised by criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson to civil trials); Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that Batson applied regardless of whether the criminal defend-
ant and excluded juror were of the same race). Notwithstanding this wide scope of Batson, 
this Note relies exclusively on the original Batson circumstances both for convenience and 
because it is representative of the largest number of cases alleging the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges. 
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "Johnson 
carried his burden of proving intentional discrimination by establishing that the prosecutor's 
four race-neutral explanations were a pretext"); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 962 (3rd Cir. 
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challenging a peremptory strike can convince a trial judge during 
the final stage of the Batson hearing that the explanation offered by 
a prosecutor in support of a peremptory strike is pretextual,13 then 
she will prevail as a matter of law.14 
In the process of determining whether a peremptory strike is 
valid, lower courts rely on the TI.tie VII burden-shifting framework 
originally laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.15 As a result, the order and presentation of proof 
in Batson cases deliberately parallels the order and presentation of 
proof in TI.tie VII intentional discrimination suits. In light of this 
similarity, the Supreme Court's recent TI.tie VII ruling in St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks16 - that proof of pretext under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework is not the legal equivalent to proof of in-
tentional discrimination - raises questions regarding the role of 
pretext evidence in the operation of the present Batson proof 
structure. 
This Note argues that notwithstanding Batson's reliance on the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the current stan-
dard of proof under Batson should not be altered along the lines 
suggested by Hicks. Part I contends that Batson and its progeny are 
an affirmative effort by the Court to eliminate racism in jury selec-
tion. Part II analyzes the Court's ruling in Hicks and specifically 
focuses on the Court's reasons for rejecting proof of pretext as the 
legal equivalent of proof of intentional discrimination in TI.tie VII 
cases. Finally, Part III argues that there are fundamental differ-
ences between the TI.tie VII employment discrimination context 
and Batson cases, and as such, the logic underlying Hicks breaks 
1993); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1121 (8th Cir. 1989); Bush v. State, 615 So. 2d 
137 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); People v. Kindelan, 572 N.E2d 1138, 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); 
Foster v. Spartanburg Hosp. Sys., 442 S.E2d 624, 626 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); Miller-El v. State, 
790 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
Throughout this Note I use the tenns pretext, pretext evidence and proof of pretext inter-
changeably. In all cases, they are intended to refer to the circumstance in which a defendant 
raising a Batson objection offers evidence to prove or actually establishes that a prosecutor's 
explanation for a peremptory challenge, for whatever reason, is unworthy of credence. 
13. In a recent per curiam opinion, Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), the Supreme 
Court clarified the stage at which it is appropriate for a trial judge to rule on the legitimacy of 
a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge. In particular, the Court held that so 
long as the prosecutor's reason(s) is facially valid then the trial court must withhold judgment 
until the final stage of the Batson hearing in which the defendant is provided an opportunity 
to establish that the prosecutor's explanation is pretextual. 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71. 
14. See, e.g., Trahan v. City of Oakland, 15 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1993), available in LEXIS, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37498; Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 229 (2nd Cir. 1987); Tursio v. 
United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C. 1993); Oliver v. State, 826 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Ct. 
App.1992). 
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas for the rules of the prima facie burden of proof); see also infra notes 47-
52 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the McDonnell-Doug/as framework). 
16. 113 s. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
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down when applied in cases alleging the discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges. 
I. BATSON.' ITS PURPOSE AND APPLICATION 
This Part examines the Court's landmark ruling in Batson and 
describes how lower courts have applied it. Section I.A argues that 
Batson was a reaction to Swain v. Alabama, and was intended to 
ease the burden of proof on criminal defendants challenging the 
States' use of peremptories. Section I.B explores the operation of 
Batson's three-part proof structure. Section I.C argues that estab-
lishing pretext is presently the critical question in Batson cases. 
A. An Interpretation of Batson 
To understand Batson it is important to recognize that Batson 
was a direct response to an earlier, much maligned, peremptory 
challenge case: Swain v. Alabama.11 The decision in Batson was a 
clear rejection of the notion embraced by the Court in Swain that it 
was reasonable to assume that a prosecutor's strikes were based on 
legitimate considerations. Section I.A.l argues that Batson eased 
Swain's excessive burden of proof and reversed Swain's presump-
tion regarding the discriminatory potential of peremptory chal-
lenges. Section I.A.2 contends that in addition to relieving Swain's 
excessive burden of proof, Batson sought to alleviate two other 
harms caused by discriminatory peremptories: harm to the ex-
cluded juror, and harm to the integrity of the justice system. 
1. Batson as a Reaction to Swain 
For over a century the Supreme Court has held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids race-
based exclusion of blacks from service on grand and petit juries.18 
It was not until 1965, however, that the Court first addressed the 
specific question of whether race-based peremptory challenges vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment. In Swain v. Alabama, 19 the Court 
17. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). For criticism of Swain, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 
N.E.2d 499, 510 n.12 (Mass.) ("In light of the extensive criticism of Swain, and in recognition 
of the negligible protection that decision offers to a defendant asserting the right to trial by 
jury of peers, we take this opportunity to depart from applying its rule perfunctorily .... "), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) 
("[T]he challenge allowed in Swain may be too limited .... [T]he California experience with 
the Swain rule has resulted in numerous attempts to meet the Swain burden with no success 
•... " (citations omitted)); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, 
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 164 (1989) 
("Under Swain, the Constitution guaranteed minorities only an opportunity to reach the 
finals before a government officer discriminated against them."). 
18. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 
(1972); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
492 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:488 
recognized that, in principle, proof of the systematic exclusion of 
blacks through the State's use of peremptory challenges was suffi-
cient to establish a violation of the Constitution.20 
Nevertheless, in practice, the burden of proof required to pre-
vail under Swain was nearly insurmountable. In order to show a 
constitutional violation, a defendant had to demonstrate that the 
prosecutor challenged blacks "in case after case, whatever the cir-
cumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the 
victim may be."21 As a result, Swain did little, on a case-by-case 
basis, to deter prosecutors from challenging veniremembers solely 
on the basis of race.22 
By the mid-1980s, faced with compelling evidence of the contin-
ued use of racially motivated peremptory challenges,23 the Supreme 
Court decided to reconsider its primary holding in Swain. In Bat-
20. Although the· Court embraced the principle that " 'fi]urymen should be selected as 
individuals, ·on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race,' "380 U.S. 
at 204 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950)), it appeared reluctant to lessen the 
evidentiary burden placed on defendants challenging peremptory strikes. 
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the 
presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support 
a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unre-
lated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is 
being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of justice enjoyed by the white population. 
380 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added). 
21. 380 U.S. at 223. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Court's ruling in Swain was 
that although "there never ha(d] been a Negro on a petit jury in either a civil or criminal case 
in Talladega County," the majority nonetheless ruled against Swain on the grounds that he 
lacked sufficient evidence to establish that discrimination occurred at his trial. 380 U.S. 223-
24. In fact, Justice Goldberg noted in his dissent that "[s]ince it is undisputed that no Negro 
has ever served on a jury in the history of the county, and a great number of cases have 
involved Negroes, the only logical conclusion ... is that in a good many cases Negroes have 
been excluded by the state prosecutor." 380 U.S. at 235 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
22. At least one commentator noted that "[a]lthough courts are inclined to say that the 
defendant's burden of showing ... systematic exclusion by the prosecutor 'is not insunnount-
able,' experience has clearly indicated the 'virtual impossibility' of doing so." 2 WAYNER. 
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, C!uMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(d), at 739 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). In fact, during the two decades before the Court decided Batson, there were only 
two reported cases in which a plaintiff prevailed under the Swain evidentiary standard. See 
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 45, Batson (No. 84-6263) (citing State v. Brown, 
371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979)), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Con-
gressional Info. Serv.); and see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). 
23. One clear illustration can be found in the Dallas County, Texas, District Attorney's 
Office's instruction manual provided to new prosecutors. In particular, the instructions re-
garding jury selection read: 
III. What to look for in a juror 
A. Attitudes 
1. You are not looking for a fair juror but rather a strong, biased and some-
times hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different from 
them in kind, rather than degree. 
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority group which may subject 
him to oppression - they almost always empathize with the accused. 
3. You are not looking for free-thinkers and flower children .••• 
Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal 
Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 192, 224 (1978) (emphasis added). 
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son v. Kentucky, 24 the Court held that race-based peremptory chal-
lenges in a criminal case where the defendant and struck juror are 
both black violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
James K. Batson, a black man, was arrested and charged by the 
State of Kentucky with second-degree burglary and receipt of sto-
len goods.2s During the course of jury selection, the State used four 
of its six peremptory challenges to excuse all four black 
veniremembers.26 In response, Batson moved to discharge the jury 
on the ground that the State's challenges violated his constitutional 
rights under the Fourteenth Am.endment.27 The trial judge, how-
ever, rejected Batson's argument noting that the parties could 
"strike 'anybody they want to.' "28 The Supreme Court ultimately 
granted certiorari and ruled that race-based peremptory challenges 
were unconstitutional and that, in order to prevail, a criminal de-
fendant need not prove that the individual prosecutor had a history 
of exercising discriminatory strikes.29 
The Court in Batson clearly rejected the notion underlying 
Swain, that it was reasonable - even if the State had peremptorily 
challenged all black veniremembers - to assume that a prosecu-
Another previously circulated jury selection guide instructed Dallas County prosecutors 
not to "take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury no 
matter how rich or well educated." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103, n.3 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (quoting the DALIAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at 29). Other ex-
amples include checklists advising attorneys to establish "prototypes" and initially decide 
whether to exclude individuals on the basis of their race. See Kelner, Jury Selection: The 
Prejudice Syndrome, N.Y. STATE B.J., Feb. 1984, at 35-38. 
These practices led Justice White to comment that "the practice of peremptorily eliminat-
ing blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so 
that I agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs." 476 U.S. at 
101 (White, J., concurring). 
24. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
25. See 476 U.S. at 82. 
26. See 476 U.S. at 83. 
27. See 476 U.S. at 83. The case was ultimately decided solely on the basis of Batson's 
Fourteenth Amendment claim. In the eyes of the Court: 
Petitioner has framed his argument in .•. an apparent effort to avoid inviting the Court 
directly to reconsider one of its own precedents .... [R]esolution of petitioner's claim 
properly turns on application of equal protection principles and [we] express no view on 
the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments. 
476 U.S. at 84 n.4. 
28. 476 U.S. at 83. 
29. See 476 U.S. at 96; see Dave Harbeck, Comment, Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries: 
Applying United States v. De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in 
the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 11 MINN. L. REV. 689, 697 n.55 (1993). 
As Justice Marshall commented, "[f]or evidentiary requirements to dictate that 'several 
must suffer discrimination' before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of 
equal protection to all." 476 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
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tor's strikes were based on legitimate considerations.30 In fact, Bat-
son explicitly recognized that peremptory challenges allow "those 
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate"31 and that 
Swain's "crippling burden of proof" essentially had immunized 
such challenges from constitutional review.32 
Batson recognized that the burden in Swain had been insur-
mountable and established a new three-stage analysis, based on TI-
tie VII, which was clearly aimed at malting objections to 
discriminatory peremptory challenges more viable.33 Furthermore, 
the Court stated that in meeting Batson's lower burden of proof, 
the objecting party could rely on the fact that the peremptories of-
fer the opportunity to discriminate.34 The Batson Court's decision 
to lessen the standard of proof required to show a constitutional 
violation makes it substantially easier for a defendant to prevent a 
prosecutor from exercising racially motivated peremptory 
challenges. 
2. Batson's Three Harms 
Although Batson primarily focused on the constitutional harm 
suffered by the criminal defendant as a result of race-based per-
emptory challenges,35 the Court also identified two additional 
harms, arising from discriminatory peremptory challenges: the 
harm to the excluded juror, and the harm to the integrity of the 
justice system as a whole.36 In the cases that expanded Batson-
Powers v. Ohio,37 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,38 Georgia v. 
30. According to the Swain Court, "it [was] permissible to insulate from inquiry the re-
moval of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on 
acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved 
and the particular crime charged." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 {1965). 
31. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 {1953)). 
32. See 476 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that "[s]ince ... Swain has placed on defendants a 
crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny"). 
33. See 476 U.S. at 92-93 (rejecting Swain's "crippling burden of proof" in favor of Title 
VII's three-part test). For a discussion of Batson's three-part test see infra section I.B. 
34. See 476 U.S. at 96 ("[T]he defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there 
can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" (quoting Avery, 345 U.S. at 562)). 
35. See 476 U.S. at 86 (holding that "[p]urposeful racial discrimination in the selection of 
the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protec-
tion that a trial by jury is intended to secure"). 
36. See 476 U.S. at 87-88; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 114 S. a. 1419, 1427 (1994) 
(reasoning that "[t]he community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation 
of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system 
that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders"). 
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that Batson applies regardless of whether the criminal 
defendant and excluded juror are of the same race). 
38. 500 U.S. 614 {1991) (ruling that Batson applies in the context of civil as well as crimi-
nal trials). 
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McCollum,39 andJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.40-the Court specifically 
focused upon the impact of these two harms. Essentially, what 
emerges from these four subsequent cases is the fundamental prin-
ciple that the legitimacy of our system of justice is severely under-
mined by the continued existence of racial discrimination in the jury 
selection process. More specifically, the Court reasoned that: 
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is 
fundamental to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals 
of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the law 
- that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the 
chance to take part directly in our democracy .... When persons are 
excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely be-
cause of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integ-
rity of our judicial system is jeopardized.41 
The Court's unwavering adherence to this important principle illus-
trates the significance it places on the struggle to eradicate racial 
discrimination from the process by which we select juries.42 
B. Batson's Three-Stage Analysis . 
In order to lessen Swain's burden of proof and to facilitate the 
consideration of indirect and circumstantial evidence in cases alleg-
ing the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, Batson 
adopted the three-stage Title VII disparate treatment burden-
shifting proof structure established by the Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green. 43 The Court's choice of this framework 
reflected its recognition of two important principles. First, that the 
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment remains with the criminal defendant.44 
39. 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that Batson applies to race-based peremptory challenges 
exercised by defendants). 
40. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that the principles underlying Batson also apply to 
gender-based peremptory challenges). 
41. 114 S. Ct. at 1430. 
42. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty notwithstanding undisputed evidence of 
its disparate impact on blacks), it would be disingenuous to argue that the Court's grave 
concern over eradicating racial discrimination in the jury-selection process extends equally to 
all phases of our justice system. . 
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) ("[O]ur 
decisions concerning 'disparate treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
have explained the operation of the prima facie burden of proof rules." (citing McDonnell 
Douglas)). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a black civil rights activist who had been 
refused reemployment as a mechanic on the grounds that he had participated in a series of 
illegal protests. 
44. See 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). 
Those bringing a challenge under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must establish discriminatory intent in order to prevail. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). In other words, the " 'invidious quality' of governmental action [i.e. per-
emptory challenges] claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a 
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 
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Second, that it is inherently difficult to prove intentional discrimina-
tion without reference to circumstantial evidence.4s As a result, the 
Court noted that in weighing whether a defendant has carried his 
burden of persuasion, courts should make a careful and searching 
inquiry into any evidence that may be relevant to establishing dis-
criminatory intent.46 To facilitate this inquiry, the Court borrowed 
the Title VII proof structure .. 
This section examines the workings of this burden-shifting 
scheme. It explores first how the scheme operates in its original 
Title VII context and then how it works under Batson. 
1. The Roots of Batson 's Proof Structure 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established a 
burden-shifting proof structure for resolving Title VII intentional 
discrimination cases.47 Under this framework, a plaintiff initially 
240); see also Benjamin Hoom Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After 
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment 
Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REv. 191, 194-95 n.18 (arguing that peremptory challenges are exam-
ples of disparate impact and that Batson was an effort to make findings of intentional dis-
crimination possible). 
Note also that a " 'finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to 
appropriate deference by a reviewing court." 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Bes-
semer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 {1985)). Moreover, because "the trial judge's findings in the 
context under consideration here largely will tum on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing 
court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (quoting 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575-76). 
45. See 476 U.S. at 93-96. Courts consistently have held that due to the inherent diffi-
culty in proving intentional discrimination, "[i]nsistence upon direct ..• evidence would cre-
ate insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs." King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 {1987). 
46. In particular, the Court noted that "a court must undertake 'a sensitive inquiry into 
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.'" 476 U.S. at 93 (quot-
ing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 {1977)). 
47. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792. The allocation of shifting burdens in dispa-
rate treatment cases was designed to allow plaintiffs lacking a "smoking gun" to prevail 
under Title VII. Courts recognized that an "[i]nsistence upon direct • . . evidence would 
create insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs in discrimination cases." King, 778 
F.2d at 881. 
~ovember 1995) Note - Batson and Proof of Pretext 497 
must prove a prim.a facie case48 of intentional discrimination in or-
der to state a valid Title VII claim.49 
If the plaintiff is successful at this first stage, the burden of pro-
duction shifts to the employer at the second stage to come forward 
with a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for its adverse em-
ployment action.so For example, at this second stage an employer 
might contend that the plaintiff was fired because of poor perform-
ance evaluations or frequent tardiness. It does not matter, for pur-
poses of stage two analysis, if the proffered reason is credible, or if 
it was the real reason for the employer's action. All that matters is 
that the reason asserted be facially nondiscriminatory. 
Once the employer offers a facially valid justification, stage 
three of the McDonnell Douglas framework affords the plaintiff an 
opportunity to demonstrate that the reason proffered is pretextual 
and that race was the real reason for the adverse employment ac-
tion.51 During this final "pretext" stage of proof, plaintiffs can pre-
48. The term prima facie case in the Title VII context "denote[s] the establishment of a 
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," rather than "the plaintiff's burden of producing 
enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Texas Dept. of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). According to the Court: 
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only 
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based 
on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this 
largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not 
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business 
setting. 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 {1978) (citation omitted). 
49. In particular, the plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) he "belongs to 
a racial minority"; {2) "he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants"; (3) "despite his qualifications, he was rejected"; and (4) "after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from per-
sons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
50. In Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248, {1981), the Supreme Court clarified the exact nature of 
this second-stage burden. Specifically at issue in Burdine was whether the employer's 
second-stage burden is one of production or persuasion. In other words, the Court was asked 
to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas standard required that a Title VII defendant per-
suade the court that it was "actually motivated" by the reason(s) proffered; or, whether it was 
sufficient for an employer simply to introduce evidence that "raises a genuine issue of fact as 
to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." 450 U.S. at 254-55. 
The distinction between these two production requirements is significant. Under the 
former, an employer would be required not only to come forward with a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action but also to convince the factfinder by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it actually was motivated by the proffered reason. By contrast, 
under the latter production requirement, an employer would satisfy its burden simply by 
articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of whether it proved to be the 
"true" motivation behind the adverse employment action. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 {1993) (holding that "[b]y producing evidence {whether ulti-
mately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons, petitioners [defendants] sustained 
their burden of production"). 
51. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. This final stage does not occur, however, if 
the defendant is unable to articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse 
employment action, namely one that on its face does not violate Title VII. In such circum-
stances, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in her favor because the de-
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vail either directly, by showing that a discriminatory purpose more 
likely than not motivated the employer, or indirectly, by proving 
that the employer's explanation lacks credibility.52 For instance, 
under the first option, a plaintiff might offer evidence establishing 
that his employer had a history of using racial epithets to refer to 
him and other black employees. By contrast, under the second op-
tion a plaintiff could establish that his firing was racially motivated 
because white employees with equally poor or worse performance 
evaluations or similar tardiness problems did not lose their jobs. 
2. How Batson's Proof Structure Operates 
Under Batson's first stage, a criminal defendant, like a Title VII 
plaintiff, must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In par-
ticular, the Batson Court stated that: 
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable 
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to remove veniremembers of the defendant's race. Second, the 
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no 
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection prac-
tice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate.' Fmally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other 
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
that practice to exclude the veniremembers from the petit jury on ac-
count of their race.53 
fendant has failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination previously established by the 
prima facie case. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748. 
52. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Marina C. Stzteinbok provides a helpful explanation of 
these two avenues of proof. She notes the following: 
[U]nder McDonnell Douglas, both the type of evidence the plaintiff introduces and the 
method of proof itself are indirect. The distinction Burdine established between "direct" 
and "indirect" modes of proving pretext must be understood in this context. The plain-
tiff uses circumstantial evidence whether pretext is proved directly or indirectly. By in-
voking the "more likely" strand of Burdine, the plaintiff proves discrimination 
affirmatively (i.e. "directly") through the introduction of circumstantial evidence. By 
invoking the "unworthy of credence" strand, however, the plaintiff proves discrimination 
"indirectly," without needing to build an affirmative case that the defendant more likely 
than not discriminated. 
Marina C. Stzteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Disparate Treatment 
Claims After Aikens, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1118 n.34 (1988). 
53. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (citations omitted). 
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If successfu1,s4 at the second stage of proof the burden of produc-
tion then shifts to the State to offer a facially valid race-neutral ex-
planation for the strike.ss 
Recently, in Purkett v. Elem,56 the Supreme Court clarified the 
exact nature of this second stage burden under Batson. The Court 
specifically addressed the question of whether a criminal defendant, 
at the second stage of the Batson framework, is entitled to judg-
ment in his favor if a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory 
challenge appears implausible on its face.57 In reversing the Eighth 
Circuit, which had ruled in favor of the defendant, the Court held 
that the Court of Appeals erred "by ... requiring that the justifica-
tion tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least 
minimally persuasive."58 Essentially, therefore, Elem represents 
the Burdine of the Batson line of cases, insofar as it stands for the 
proposition that at the second stage of proof the challenged party 
bears a burden of production, not persuasion. s9 
Notwithstanding Elem, a prosecutor will not succeed in rebut-
ting the prima facie case at the second Batson stage merely by as-
serting that he sensed that a black juror would be partial to the 
defendant because they were both black.60 Batson cautioned that 
prosecutors may not overcome the inference of discrimination sim-
ply by stating that their strike was in good faith and not motivated 
54. Among the considerations the Court mentioned as relevant to the determination 
whether a prima facie case has been established were "a 'pattern' of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire" and the "prosecutor's questions and statements dur-
ing voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges." 476 U.S. at 97. 
The Court also noted that, in weighing the evidence in support of a prima facie case, "the 
trial court must undertake a 'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory 
factors' in the particular case." 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 
630 (1972)). 
55. 476 U.S. at 97. Although the state is required to come forward with some 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying 
exercise of a challenge for cause." 476 U.S. at 97. 
56. 115 s. Ct. 1769 (1995). 
57. In Elem, the prosecutor had justified his strike on the ground that the veniremember 
"had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared 
to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder 
length, curly, unkempt hair." 115 S. Ct. at 1770. 
In reaction to the majority's ruling, the dissenters noted that: 
The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, to-
gether with its assumption that there is a difference of constitutional magnitude between 
a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I chal-
lenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values 
vindicated by our decision in Batson. 
115 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. 115 S. Ct. at 1771. 
59. See supra note 50 (discussing the Court's ruling in Burdine). 
60. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); see supra notes 1-10 and accompany-
ing text. 
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by a discriminatory animus.61 Instead, the prosecutor must offer a 
race-neutral explanation that is relevant to the case at hand.62 
Ultimately, if a trial or reviewing court determines at the third 
stage that the reasons asserted by the prosecutor at stage two are 
insufficient to overcome the inference of discrimination, the crimi-
nal defendant is entitled to the appropriate relief.63 For example, a 
prosecutor might claim that her peremptory challenge was based on 
her belief that a black veniremember's prior criminal record would 
make him a bad juror for the State's case. Although this explana-
tion is legitimate on its face, and therefore satisfies the State's 
second-stage burden under Elem, a defendant could still prevail at 
the third stage if he could establish that the prosecutor's explana-
tion was pretextual. In other words, if the defendant could prove 
that the black veniremember who was struck did not actually have a 
criminal record, or that white veniremembers with similar records 
had not been struck, then the defendant would be entitled to relief 
under Batson. 
In many cases, the presence of one or more of the following five 
factors will support a defendant's conclusion that the prosecutor's 
explanation is pretextual: 
1. The reason given for the peremptory challenge is not related to the 
facts of the case; 2. There was a lack of questioning to the challenged 
juror or a lack of meaningful questions; 3. Disparate treatment -
persons with the same or similar characteristics as the challenged ju-
ror were not struck; 4. Disparate examination of members of the ve-
nire, i.e., questioning a challenged juror so as to evoke a certain 
response without asking the same question of other panel members; 
and 5. An explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is 
not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically.64 
Consequently, under the Batson proof structure, if the defendant is 
successful in proving pretext by establishing one of these factors, he 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
C. Pretext Evidence in the Batson Proof Structure 
In accordance with the explicit mandate of Batson, lower courts 
have employed the McDonnell Douglas framework in cases alleging 
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Increasingly, the 
61. See 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting in part Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 {1972)). 
62. See 476 U.S. at 98. 
63. See 476 U.S. at 100; see also State v. Singfield, No. 16253, 1994 WL 30482, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1994) ("The third step of the Batson analysis requires the court to reach the 
ultimate issue of whether the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation was merely a pretext 
.... "). 
64. Edwards v. State, Nos. 05-91-00651-CR & 05-91-00652-CR, 1992 WL 276483, at *3-4 
(Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1992) (citing Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1988)). 
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focus of inquiry in such cases has shifted away from the prima facie 
case toward an assessment of the adequacy of the prosecutor's prof-
fered reasons for the challenged strike. 65 
One explanation for this high degree of scrutiny at the pretext 
stage is the standard of proof that is required to prevail under Bat-
son. Because proof of pretext under Batson is the legal equivalent 
to proof of intentional discrimination, many state and federal 
judges, in order to expedite Batson hearings, ask prosecutors to of-
fer a race-neutral explanation for their challenges even before a 
prima facie case is established.66 The enormous significance that 
trial judges place on pretext evidence means that an increasing 
number of Batson motions are decided solely on the basis of 
whether the trial judge is convinced that the. prosecutor's proffered 
reasons are pretextual.67 
In light of the wide range of explanations considered race-
neutral under Batson, 68 however, prosecutors readily can succeed in 
exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges.69 For example, a 
prosecutor legitimately can justify a strike based on the fact that the 
excluded juror has a relative who has been prosecuted for a crime,70 
lives in the same county as the defendant,71 wears dark glasses,72 
wears a hat,73 or is young or unmarried,74 all of which make it ex-
tremely difficult for defendants to prevail on Batson motions at 
trial. Moreover, due to the factual nature of a trial judge's ruling 
65. See Jeffery S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Deny-
ing That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 511, 583 n.380 (arguing that this shift in focus 
"reflects the desire for quick determination of Batson objections"). 
66. See id. (listing examples of circuit court opinions that have benefited from this 
practice). 
67. A failure on the part of the defendant to "respond or offer any rebuttal to the prose-
cutor's reasons precludes appellate consideration of the issue of pretext." Id. at 590. 
68. For a detailed discussion of the wide range of reasons considered legitimate under 
Batson, see Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explana-
tions Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 229 (1993) (arguing in particular that 
prosecutors' strikes can be classified into 12 basic categories - Age, Occupation, Unemploy-
ment, Religion, Demeanor, Relationship with a Trial Participant, Lack of "Intelligence," So-
cioeconomic Status, Residence, Marital Status, Previous Involvement with the Criminal 
Justice System, and Jury Experience - many of which serve as pretexts for racial 
discrimination). 
69. See generally id. In particular, Raphael & Ungvarsky argue that 
[I]n almost any situation a prosecutor can readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation 
to justify striking black jurors because of their race. This is especially true when only a 
single or a few jurors are struck because it is less obvious that a pattern of striking blacks 
is involved. 
Id. at 236. 
70. See People v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 (Ct. App. 1987). 
71. See Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 583 (Miss. 1988). 
72. See State v. Williams, 545 So. 2d 651, 654-55 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
73. See Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (Miss. 1987). 
74. See People v. Taylor, 524 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
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regarding whether a proffered reason is pretextual, reviewing courts 
are required to grant enormous deference to these findings.1s 
Although the exact standard varies from state to state, generally a 
reviewing court cannot reverse a ruling below unless, after assessing 
the entire voir dire transcript, it " 'is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' "76 
Notwithstanding this extremely deferential standard of review, 
20% of state77 and 10% of federal78 Batson cases in which the legit-
imacy of the prosecutor's explanation was an issue on appeal, were 
reversed on the ground that the trial judge committed clear error in 
accepting - as nondiscriminatory - the proffered explanation for 
the peremptory challenge.79 In other words, in all of these cases, 
the reviewing court was convinced after assessing the voir dire tran-
script that the prosecutor's reasons for the strike were pretextual, 
which under Batson is the legal equivalent to proof of intentional 
discrimination. 
II. HicKs: AL'IERING THE McDONNELL DouoLAs FRAMEWORK 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision last term in St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks, 80 the federal circuits were sharply divided 
75. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) ("'[A] finding of intentional 
discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. 
Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on 
evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great defer-
ence." (citation omitted)). 
In particular, the Supreme Court has held that a trial court's factual findings - of which a 
finding of pretext is one - may not be reversed on appeal even if the reviewing court is 
"convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice 
between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-
74 (1985). 
76. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
77. As of May 1, 1994, there were 378 state and 79 federal Batson cases in which the 
appellant alleged that the trial judge committed clear error in accepting the prosecutor's 
ostensibly race-neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory strike. Of the Batson 
cases in state courts where pretext was an issue on appeal, 74 out of 378 were reversed be-
cause the reviewing court concluded that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenged 
peremptory strike was pretextual. This search was accomplished by first searching the 
Allstates-Allfeds directories on Westlaw for all cases which included the words Batson and 
pretext. From this list of cases, the author counted those cases which were reversed for 
pretext. 
78. As of May 1, 1994, 8 out of 79 Batson cases in federal court where pretext was an 
issue on appeal were reversed because the reviewing court concluded that the prosecutor's 
explanation for the challenged peremptory strike was pretextual. 
79. One possible conclusion that can be drawn from these reversal rates is that federal 
and state trial judges are not adequately upholding the mandate of Batson. In fact, some 
judges have expressed open hostility toward Batson. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 721 
F. Supp. 1077, 1079-82 (E.D. Mo. 1989); People v. Banks, 609 N.E.2d 864, 871-72 {Ill. App. 
Ct. 1993). 
80. 113 s. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
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on the question whether proof of pretext in a Title VII disparate 
treatment case was equivalent, as a matter of law, to proof of inten-
tional discrimination.8.1 In general, the appellate courts that ad-
dressed the issue adopted one of two distinct standards. Some 
circuits embraced a "pretext-only" approach,82 treating proof of 
pretext by the plaintiff as the legal equivalent to proof of inten-
tional discrimination. In practice, this approach is the functional 
equivalent to the current standard of proof in Batson cases. Other 
circuits, however, advocated a pretext-plus approachS3 that only en-
81. Compare EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
establishing pretext does not mandate a finding of illegal discrimination); Galbraith v. North-
ern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 945 
{1992); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 {1st Cir. 1991) (same); Holder v. City 
of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 {4th Cir. 1989) (same); Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental 
Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 483 
U.S. 1006 {1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(same), with Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that 
a finding pretext mandates finding intentional discrimination), revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); 
Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2nd Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 880 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); 'fye v. 
Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); 
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Thornbrough v. Columbus & 
Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Duffy v. Wheeling 
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3rd Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1087 (1984). Also, for a general discussion of the law prior to Hicks, see Catherine J. Lanc-
tot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsuNGs L.J. 57 {1991). 
82. See, e.g., Dister v. Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (ruling that 
"a plaintiff may prevail upon a showing that the employer's given legitimate reason is unwor-
thy of credence"); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 {8th Cir. 1988) (finding 
that "[a]s a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a 
discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may 
persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred"); Chipollini 
v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 {3d Cir.) {holding that "[i]f the plaintiff [shows] that 
it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the 
employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evidence produced by 
the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent"), cert. dis-
missed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 647 (arguing that the plaintiff "is not 
required to prove that the [defendant] was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade 
the factfinder that the [defendant's] purported good reasons were untrue"); see also Lanctot, 
supra note 81, at 71-81 (discussing in greater depth the arguments in favor of a "pretext-only" 
approach). 
83. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
"[i]f the presumption is rebutted, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and that the employ-
ment decision was based on a sexually-discriminatory criterion"); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 
883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 {11th Cir. 1989) (finding that "merely establishing pretext, without 
more, is insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimination"); Keyes v. Secretary of 
Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) {ruling that "it was plaintiff's burden not only to 
show that the defendant's proffered reasons for hiring someone else were apocryphal, but 
that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination"); Benzies, 810 
F.2d at 148 {ruling that plaintiffs have "the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the 
reasons advanced ••. are a pretext and that the substantial or motivating factor in the de-
fendant's decision was discrimination and but for that discrimination, the plaintiff would have 
been appointed"); see also Lanctot, supra note 81, at 81-91 {addressing the arguments in 
favor of a "pretext-plus" standard). 
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abled the factfinder to draw a permissible, rather than mandatory, 
inference of discrimination from a finding of pretext. In practice, 
pretext-plus courts often required the plaintiff not only to prove 
that the employer's reason was pretextual, but also to offer addi-
tional evidence that discrimination was the real motivation behind 
the adverse employment action.84 In contrast, pretext-only courts 
presumed that discrimination was the real reason as soon as the 
plaintiff proved that the employer's explanation was unworthy of 
credence. In Hicks, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in 
favor of the pretext-plus courts, holding that proof of pretext alone 
does not mandate a finding of intentional discrimination. 
This Part analyzes the Court's decision in Hicks with particular 
attention paid to its reasons for rejecting the principle that proof of 
pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework is legally 
equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. This Part con-
cludes that the Court was concerned that a "pretext-only" standard 
subjected employers to an unreasonable risk of unwarranted 
liability. 
Prior to an administrative shake-up at St. Mary's Honor Center, 
Melvin Hicks, a black shift commander, consistently received satis-
factory job performance evaluations. Following a series of supervi-
sory changes, however, he was subjected to "repeated, and 
increasingly severe, disciplinary actions" which ultimately resulted 
in his dismissal from the job.ss In response to his termination, 
Hicks filed a race discrimination suit against St. Mary's. At the 
trial, the court concluded that the justifications St. Mary's offered 
for firing Hicks - the severity and accumulation of rules violations 
- were merely pretextual because similarly situated white cowork-
ers were not subjected to comparable disciplinary actions.s6 
Notwithstanding this evidence of disparate treatment, the trial 
judge ruled in favor of St. Mary's on the ground that Hicks had not 
proven that the crusade to terminate him "was racially rather than 
personally motivated."87 The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower 
court ruling, concluding that by offering a pretextual reason for its 
actions, St. Mary's had failed to rebut the prima facie case of 
discrimination.ss 
84. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752. 
85. 113 S. Ct. at 2746. 
86. See 113 S. Ct. at 2748. 
87. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991), revd., 970 
F.2d 487 {8th Cir. 1992), revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 {1993). 
88. Relying on existing precedent, Hicks argued on appeal that because he had success-
fully discredited St. Mary's proffered explanations for his tennination, he was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In agreeing with Hicks, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because "all of defendants' prof-
fered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate 
reason for their actions." Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 {8th Cir. 1992), 
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The specific question presented to the Court -in Hicks89 was 
whether the trier of fact in a Title VII disparate treatment case was 
compelled to find for the plaintiff if it disbelieved the employer's 
proffered reasons for taking an adverse employment action.9o A 
sharply divided Court ruled that proof of pretext within the 
McDonnell-Douglas framework did not, as a matter of law, man-
date a judgment for the plaintiff.91 Rather, according to the major-
ity, discrediting the defendant's proffered reasons for its action only 
permits the trier of fact to draw a permissible inference that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.92 
The Court's ruling in Hicks established the principle that an em-
ployer's unpersuasive or contrived justifications for an adverse em-
ployment action are not the equivalent to proof of intentional 
discrimination.93 Implicit in the Court's holding was the view, pre-
viously expressed by various lower courts, that a wide variety of 
reasons might exist for terminating an employee, none of which rise 
to the level of violating Title VII.94 For example, an employer 
might feel compelled to offer an explanation that it knows to be 
false rather than admit in pleadings or open court that its actions 
were actually the result of personal favoritism, dislike, politics, an 
arbitrary decision, or clerical or administrative mistakes.95 More-
over, it is often the case that the defendant is a company that is 
forced to rely on the testimony and recollection of various employ-
ees regarding their state of mind or the actions and motivations of 
other employees,96 all of which makes it extremely difficult specifi-
cally to identify the "real" motivation for the adverse employment 
action. Referring to this problem, the Hicks Court noted: 
[T]he employer's 'proffered explanation,' his 'stated reasons,' his 'ar-
ticulated reasons,' [do not] somehow exist apart from the record - in 
some pleading, or perhaps in some formal, nontestimonial statement 
made on behalf of the defendant to the factfinder. ("Your honor, 
revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Consequently, they "were in no better position than if they had 
remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully 
discriminated .•• on the basis of ... race." 970 F.2d at 492. 
89. See 113 S. Ct. at 2742. 
90. See 113 S. Ct. at 2746. 
91. See 113 S. Ct. at 2748. 
92. See 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
93. See 113 S. Ct. at 2756. 
94. See Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 
146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987). 
95. See 810 F.2d at 148; see also EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 
1992) (arguing that "[h]uman relationships are inherently complex [and] ... employers must 
deal with a multitude of employment decisions, involving different employees, different su-
pervisors, different time periods, and an incredible array of facts that will inevitably differ 
even among seemingly similar situations"). 
96. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. 
506 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:488 
pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the defendant hereby formally as-
serts, as its reason for the dismissal at issue here, incompetence of the 
employee.") Of course it does not work like that.97 
Relying on this reasoning, the Court concluded that a proof stan-
dard that regards pretext evidence as the legal equivalent to proof 
of intentional discrimination risks unnecessarily subjecting faultless 
employers to liability under Title VII.9s 
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING HICKS TO BATSON 
Part III addresses the question of whether the Hicks standard of 
proof should be applied in the Batson context. Section III.A argues 
that because of the practical differences between Title VII and Bat-
son cases, the reasoning in Hicks is inapplicable when applied to 
cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 
Section ill.B argues that the principles that motivated the Court's 
ruling in Batson also would be undermined if its current proof 
structure were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks. 
A. An Argument Against Applying Hicks to Batson 
As argued in Part II, two primary concerns motivated the 
Court's decision in Hicks. First, in light of the wide variety of rea-
sons for why an employer might fire an employee - many of which 
may be considered illegitimate but nevertheless do not rise to the 
level of violating Title VII - proving pretext should not carry 
enormous evidentiary weight.99 In other words, even though an 
employer may have offered an "incredible" reason for an adverse 
employment action, it is too great a leap of logic to assume that 
therefore the real motivation was racial animus.100 Second, because 
proof of pretext is not necessarily affirmative proof of an intent to 
discriminate, it is wrong to hold employers liable under Title VII 
simply based on such a showing, because to do so would unfairly 
result in liability for employers that may have acted arbitrarily but 
not in violation of Title vrr.101 
The problem with applying the logic of Hicks to Batson cases 
simply because they both operate under the same McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting proof structure is that Title VII and Batson 
cases are contextually distinct. 
97. 113 S. Ct. at 2755. 
98. See 113 S. Ct. at 2756 (noting that "Title VII does not award damages against employ-
ers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only 
against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason ••• of 
race"). 
99. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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First, unlike a Title VII disparate treatment case, Batson objec-
tions do not require factfinders to analyze employment relation-
ships, which by their nature often include individual personal 
relationships that could factor - positively or negatively - into 
employment decisions. Prosecutorial peremptory strikes are rarely 
based on a personal relationship with the juror,102 virtually elimi-
nating personal animosity as a factor. 
Furthermore, the scope of evidence available on which to deter-
mine intentional discrimination differs greatly from the employ-
ment context to Batson. 103 The issues raised in Batson hearings do 
not require the parties to conduct depositions and interrogatories, 
read lengthy evidentiary records or hear from a multitude of wit-
nesses. Rather, they only require the prosecutor to offer an expla-
nation for his or her own strikes based on the transcribed voir dire 
testimony of potential jurors, which itself has been taken in the 
presence of all of the relevant parties. Equally important, however, 
is the fact that in Batson cases the individuals that are called upon 
to proffer an explanation for their actions are actually those respon-
sible for exercising the peremptory challenge. Thus, Batson stands 
in stark contrast to Title VII cases where employers are often re-
quired to rely on the testimony of individuals who were not actually 
responsible for the adverse employment action.104 In other words, 
there is no concern in Batson, as there is in the Title VII context, of 
a prosecutor being bound by the statements or actions of others. In 
Hicks, the majority emphasized the fact that Title VII employers 
are not required to stand before the court and claim "[y]our honor, 
pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the defendant hereby formally as-
serts, as its reason for the dismissal at issue here, incompetence of 
the employee."105 But this is exactly what occurs in Batson hear-
ings: under Batson, there is a concrete, contemporaneous justifica-
tion given directly to the court by the individual responsible for the 
strike. 
Finally, it is clear that applying a Hicks standard in the context 
of Batson has the potential to allow prosecutors successfully to mis-
102. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 68, at 252. Moreover, the existence of such a 
personal relationship would more than likely give rise to a challenge for cause. 
103. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2303 n.239 (1995): 
In assessing whether criticisms of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in employment discrimi-
nation cases are relevant to Batson cases, it is important to note the very significant 
differences between the two types of cases. Batson cases have no pretrial phase: no 
pleading, no discovery, no pretrial memoranda. They therefore present none of the 
usual methods for "smoking out" evidence and narrowing disputed issues. For that rea-
son alone, it is dangerous to simply transfer doctrine from one setting to the other. 
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
105. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993); see also supra notes 96-
97 and accompanying text. 
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lead, and even blatantly to lie, to a trial judge regarding their rea-
sons for exercising a peremptory challenge. As the Supreme Court 
has noted, however, 
It is difficult to imagine that ... intentional violations of defendants' 
constitutional rights by Government prosecutors who are officers of 
the court charged with upholding the law would not have a considera-
ble detrimental effect on the integrity of the process and call for judi-
cial action designed to restore order and integrity to the process.106 
With this principle in mind, it is difficult to imagine - in light of 
the long history of prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge 
- that altering the Batson proof structure along the lines suggested 
by Hicks would have anything but a "detrimental effect on the in-
tegrity of the process" of selecting juries. 
B. The Implications of Applying Hicks to Batson 
Part I of this Note focused on the Batson Court's purpose in 
lowering the standard of proof required for a criminal defendant to 
establish that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremp-
tory challenge. It noted that the Court's ruling was influenced, at 
least in part, by a concern over the widespread use of race-based 
peremptory challenges, a practice that the Court clearly intended 
Batson to counteract.107 The Court's decision to apply the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure in Batson cases, therefore, can 
and should be understood as a means of facilitating this goa1.1os 
But altering the Batson framework in accordance with Hicks would, 
like Swain, have the practical effect of placing a higher burden of 
proof on criminal defendants, thus making it more difficult to prove 
that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremptory 
challenge. 
Furthermore, application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge 
framework appears to conflict with Batson's premise that the per-
emptory challenge is "a practice 'providing the opportunity for dis-
crimination.' "109 Unlike in the employment discrimination 
context, where any number of legitimate reasons might explain an 
employer's pretextual justification for dismissing an employee, Bat-
son recognizes that pretextual justifications for peremptory strikes 
almost certainly reveal discriminatory animus.no 
106. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 522 (1983). 
107. See supra notes 36, 41-42 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra notes 44-47 (discussing why this proof structure is beneficial to parties 
trying to establish intentional discrimination without direct proof). 
109. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 
552 (1967)). 
110. See 476 U.S. at 96. 
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If Hicks were applied to Batson, it would essentially reintroduce 
a Swain-like presumption to peremptory challenge cases.111 By re-
quiring more than a showing of pretext in the Title VII context, 
Hicks creates a presumption, akin to that in Swain, that employ-
ment decisions, even those that are justified by pretextual reasons, 
are presumptively nondiscriminatory unless intentional discrimina-
tion is affirmatively proven. The Batson presumption is the exact 
opposite: the peremptory "permits 'those to discriminate who are 
of a mind to discriminate.' "112 
Application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge setting, for 
example, would create uncertainty about the proper outcome in a 
case like State v. Reliford113 where the government's explanation 
for a strike proved to be pretextual. In Reliford, a state prosecutor 
claimed that he removed a black juror because the juror knew the 
defendant from church. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that 
this explanation was pretextual because the prosecutor had not 
struck a white juror who knew the defendant from work.114 Under 
the current Batson standard, Reliford is entitled to a new trial be-
cause it is presumed that the prosecutor's pretextual justification 
for the peremptory challenge concealed a discriminatory intent. 
But if Batson were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks, the 
outcome in cases like Reliford, where the reason given is facially 
neutral but pretextual, would be less than certain. What more 
would the defendant need to show? 
For a more extreme illustration, consider United States v. 
Guevera.11s In Guevera, a federal prosecutor claimed that he used 
a peremptory challenge to excuse a black woman from the jury 
panel because she was an unemployed, single mother.116 On appeal 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on 
the ground that the prosecutor's reason was pretextual because the 
struck juror was "married, childless, and employed at the same ca-
sino as other [white] jurors who were not challenged."117 Under a 
Hicks framework, the trial judge or reviewing court could have 
found that the prosecutor's explanation was wholly unsupported by 
the record, yet still rule in favor of the prosecutor on the ground 
that the defendant had only proven pretext and not racial 
discrimination. 
111. See supra note 30. 
112. 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
113. 753 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
114. See 753 S.W.2d at 11. 
115. No. 92-10005, 1993 WL 68944 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 1993). 
116. See 1993 WL 68944, at *l. 
117. 1993 WL 68944, at *l. 
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In practice, therefore, a prosecutor could offer a patently false 
justification for a strike and then argue, notwithstanding the lack of 
a credible explanation for his actions, that the defendant is not enti-
tled to judgment because he has failed to offer sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that the strike was race-based. Such a standard 
clearly has the potential to enable prosecutors to mask racial dis-
crimination in the jury selection process by relying on a tool - a 
peremptory challenge - that is by its nature susceptible to 
misuse.118 
Finally, it is important to note that in the vast majority of cases, 
the most that the defense can prove is pretext. Hicks calls for a 
direct showing of intentional discrimination,119 which would be im-
possible in the Batson context because aside from pretext there is 
little evidence available to the defendant. Barring a prosecutor's 
use of a racial slur during voir-dire, or some similarly improbable 
misstep, it is hard to imagine what evidence of discrimination could 
exist aside from proof of pretext. 
CONCLUSION 
Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny are a powerful statement by 
the Court regarding .the importance of eradicating racial discrimina-
tion from the jury selection process. In overruling Swain, a twenty-
one year old unanimous precedent,120 the Batson Court decried 
Swain's "crippling burden of proof'121 and adopted a new standard 
of proof specifically aimed at easing the burden on criminal 
defendants. 
Although Batson itself has not succeeded fully, in practice it has 
proven far more effective than Swain in the struggle to combat the 
use of discriminatory peremptory challenges.122 As a result, it is 
particularly important that the decision in Hicks not be extended to 
the Batson context. Applying Hicks to Batson, in effect, would 
reestablish a Swain-like presumption in cases alleging the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges. Prosecutors' peremptory 
strikes would once again become "largely immune from constitu-
118. See supra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text. Although some may take offense 
to the implication that prosecutors would intentionally exercise racially motivated peremp· 
tory challenges, one need only look to the plethora of cases in recent years in which race has 
been an underlying or explicit element in the case to realize the influence that a considera-
tion such as race must play in the selection of juries. 
119. See supra Part II. 
120. The parties were so confident that the Court would not overrule Swain that the 
equal protection issues were not even briefed. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112-16 
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
121. 476 U.S. at 92. 
122. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 68; Barton, supra note 44, at 214 (describing 
Batson as a "virtual sieve"). 
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tinal scrutiny."123 As a result, both the jury selection process and 
our system of justice would suffer from the debilitating effects of 
regularly exercised discriminatory peremptory challenges, and the 
project begun in Batson - the elimination of discrimination from 
the selection of juries - would be endangered. 
123. 476 U.S. at 92. 
